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CHRISTIANITY AND PACIFISM
Richard J. Mouw
My colleague Nicholas Wolterstorff recently published an excellent book with
the title Until Peace and Justice Embrace. 1 Wolterstorff's title is itself instructive,
hecause it points to the fact that what Psalm 95 describes in the present tense-the
embrace of peace and justice-is actually an eschatological promise.
The Roman Catholic bishops also made much of this eschatological dimension
in their recent pastoral. Only in the coming kingdom, they tell us, will peace
and justice be "fully realized." Until then we will experience a "tension" between
the struggle for justice and the quest for peace.
The ongoing debates between Christian pacifists and Christian Just War
theorists can be viewed as an important argument over how we should deal with
this experienced tension, with one side arguing that in the present dispensation
the primary emphasis must be placed on a consistently non-violent witness to
the promise of peace, and the other side insisting that the doing of justice requires
us on occasion to commit acts of violence.
I will offer here some observations about the present status of this important
debate from the point of view of a Christian who subscribes to Just War theory ,
with special attention to the role of Christian philosophers in helping to clarify
the issues at stake. I will begin by offering a brief review of the reasons why
many of us are not ready to embrace a consistent pacifism. Then I will go on
to offer some comments in support of the contention that, while a significant
gap in moral thinking still separates the pacifist from the Just War theorist, that
gap ought not to be viewed as being as wide as it has sometimes been thought to be.
Many of us are not pacifists. We believe that governments have been invested
by God with the legitimate authority to use the sword in both the internal policing
of the affairs of nations and in the defense of nations against external enemies.
We also believe that there are circumstances in which citizens are justified in
wielding the sword against their own governments, when those governments
have become agents of systematic oppression. Furthermore, we believe that it
is permissible-perhaps even obligatory on occasion-for Christian citizens to
participate in these violent activities.
In allowing for these kinds of activities, it is not necessary for us to insist that
all such violence takes place "outside the perfection of Christ"-to use an Anabaptist phrase. Some Christians may, of course, want to argue that kind of case.
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But there are some of us who prefer to think that some Christian acts of violence
are legitimate exercises of Christian discipleship.
At the same time, those of us who endorse some Christian acts of violence
want to insist that there are limits to the legitimate use of violence on the part
of governments and revolutionary groups. This is the source of the criteria
associated with Just War and Just Revolution theory. These criteria are a means
of fleshing out a basic moral conviction that the use of lethal violence is under
certain conditions morally justified.
This conviction is, of course, challenged by pacifists. But to many of us it
seems a proper conviction to act upon, for several reasons. Each of these reasons
requires a much lengthier defense than I can give here. I will limit myself to
stating the reasons and providing a few brief comments on them.
First, this conviction seems to be one which comports well with the overall
thrust of the Biblical witness. In debates with pacifists, we Just War defenders
are fond of pointing to God's sanctioning of violence in the Old Testament. This
line of argument seems convincing to me. However we interpret God's intentions
in permitting, and sometimes even commanding, Israel to engage in military
campaigns, it seems to many of us that it is a clear fact of Old Testament history
that God did endorse the use of violence.
Many pacifists counter this appeal to the Old Testament by pointing to the
New Testament, and especially the teachings and example of Jesus. When the
argument focuses exclusively on such data many of us who are Just War defenders
must admit-if we are honest-to some awkward moments. Nonetheless this
sense of awkwardness does not succeed in shaking our basic confidence that the
use of lethal violence is on occasion morally justified. We want an understanding
of the Sermon on the Mount which fits into what we take to be the overall sense
of the Scriptures. This involves not only looking at Jesus' teachings in the light
of the Old Testament background, but also in relationship to the apostolic witness
and the life of the early church.
Second, this conviction that lethal violence is on occasion morally justified
seems to square with our moral intuitions. When we think of situations in which
innocent neighbors are being brutally oppressed, and in which it is possible for
us to put an end to this oppression only by violent means, many of us are inclined
to insist on the need for violent intervention. And we believe that these inclinations
are shaped by authentically Christian sensitivities-sensitivities which are shared
by others whom we believe to possess sanctified consciences.
Third, our conviction regarding the proper use of lethal violence seems to
provide us with a helpful basis for offering practical Christian advice with regard
to military policies. In many historical situations, the practical issue faced by
governments is not whether or not to employ violence but how much violence
is to be employed. Our conviction permits us to enter into that kind of discussion.
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It permits us to acknowledge as Christians that governments do have a legitimate

right to use the sword in pursuing the work of justice and peace and to offer
policy prescriptions based on the acknowledgement.
Again, none of these arguments will be convincing, as stated, to pacifist
Christians. They will respond by arguing that we Just War defenders have not
in fact properly grasped the overall sense of the Scriptures, nor are our consciences
properly sanctified, nor are we giving good Christian advice to governments.
These are challenges which we must all take seriously--even though I am convinced that a plausible case can be made for the three considerations which I
have briefly outlined.
Those, then, are some of the important issues at stake for many of us who
have been involved as Christians in the discussion of pacifism versus Just War
theory. But it is not enough to rehearse these kinds of issues which usually arise
when the question of the permissibility of violence is discussed. It is important
also to stress those fundamental commitments and concerns which all Christian
thinkers ought to hold in common when they approach these issues. I will offer,
then, four observations about matters which, if they are kept in mind, might
bring about a greater degree of rapprochement between Christian pacifists and
Christian Just War theorists.
First, all Christian thinkers, whatever their specific views about violent and
non-violent strategies, ought to be committed to the task of peace-making. Indeed,
this is an area of discussion in which the terminology used is somewhat unfortunate. Some Christian groups are referred to as "peace churches" and the rest
of use are thought of as "Just War defenders." Thus the impression is given that
some of us have a vested interest in defending and promoting warfare.
All Christians are called to be followers of the Prince of Peace. A concern
for peace-making ought not to be viewed as the exclusive property of pacifists.
The real debate, properly understood, is about the most fitting strategies for
peace-making. Just War theory was developed in response to the unbridled,
no-holds-barred militarism of ancient times. It was intended as an instrument
for reducing the number of wars, and for placing limits on the violence employed
withing military campaigns. It was intended, in short, as an instrument of peacemaking.
In his discussion of Just War criteria in the Institutes, John Calvin-who was
no friend of the Christian pacifists of his day-insisted nonetheless that Christians,
in dealing with the issues of violence, "must perform much more than the heathen
philosopher required when he wanted war to seem a seeking of peace."2 This is
also good advice for contemporary Christian philosophers who espouse a Just
War perspective: we must perform much more than our non-Christian colleagues
in insisting that war is to be justified only as a means to peace.
Thus all of us, whether we are pacifists or non-pacifists, must oppose the
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sinful spirit of militarism. In its worst form, militarism is a blatant form of
idolatry, an ultimate devotion to the gods of war. But there are less "absolute"
forms of militarism, which manifest themselves in a fondness for military solutions to international problems or which foster a spirit of vengeance which can
only be satisfied by military victories.
For some of us, the legitimate struggle against militarism does not require us
to oppose the military as such, but rather to work for the "taming" of the military.
But we should at least all agree that the phenomenon of militarism is one which
must be addressed by those who have been commanded not to rely on horses or
to trust in chariots but to look to the Holy One of Israel for help and to trust the
Lord (Isaiah 31: 1).
Second, we can all agree that the advocacy of the use of violence is, from a
Christian point of view, a very dangerous business--even though some of us
believe that it is a danger that we must live with.
One can admit that a doctrine is dangerous without thereby meaning to repudiate
that doctrine. Doctrines can be true yet dangerous. A theory may be accurate in
itself but difficult to apply accurately. Consider a parallel moral example. Suppose
that a German Christian male had the opportunity during Hitler's reign to form
an adulterous relationship with Eva Braun, Hitler's mistress, and thereby gain
important information which might well lead to the downfall of the Third Reich.
It is at least conceivable, I believe, that this might constitute a case of Just
Adultery. But suppose-and it is very interesting that we have often been much
.stricter with the adultery commandment than we have with the killing commandment-that having recognized the legitimacy of such a rare undertaking, Christians went on to formulate a Just Adultery doctrine, specifying those rare conditions under which a Christian might justifiably commit an act of adultery for a
noble and righteous cause.
Such a doctrine on my hypothesis might very well be legitimate and proper.
But suppose that this doctrine also created a tendency toward unjustified adultery-merely by officially acknowledging the fact that under certain conditions
adultery might be morally justified. Suppose further that people were then trained
to commit adultery in the event that their services might become necessary.
Suppose also that special medals of honor were awarded to outstanding adulterers.
Well, we need not follow through on the implications of such a doctrine. But
the point should be clear, and this is the only point I mean to be illustrating
here: some doctrines, however true and appropriate they might be in application
to rare cases, become dangerous when they are propagated and institutionalized.
They can themselves become a lure to sin. They can themselves become instruments of our rebellion before the face of God. And Just War defenders would
do well to consider the actual historical uses and the psychological tendencies
of their Just War teaching.
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Third, we should all agree that these issues must be considered in the context
of a much larger philosophical discussion. The questions at stake here certainly
cannot be dealt with adequately simply by checking out our moral intuitions, or
by offering alternative consequentialist calculations. Several years ago Robert
L. Holmes wrote a fascinating essay on "Violence and Nonviolence," which
was one of the award-winning essays in the Council for Philosophical Studies'
competition on the subject of violence. Holmes argued that nonviolence ought
to be viewed not as a means to some end, but as "a way of life"; if nonviolence
is to be properly thought of as a "means" at all, it is not, he said, as a "means"
in the sense of a step on some ladder which leads to "a lofty and remote
destination" but rather as a means in the sense of an "ingredient in a recipe, the
end or final product of which is made up of what is put into it. "3
I am not yet as convinced as my friend Stanley Hauerwas is that the whole
of the moral life can be understood in terms of an "ethics of virtue." But I do
think that Hauerwas and, in the case just mentioned, Robert Holmes, are pointing
to an emphasis which must be taken seriously by Christians, especially as it
bears on the questions of violence and nonviolence. The question of whether a
Christian can commit acts of violence cannot be separated from crucial questions
about the kinds of lives we are called to live. And these questions are related
to an even broader set of questions which must be explored by Christian philosophers: questions about the nature of created and fallen and redeemed reality,
questions about the good life-which cannot, of course, be reduced simply to
questions about the morally good life--questions about means and ends, ingredients and recipes, and so on.
In thinking about the issues which bear on our decisions regarding the way
of life to which we are called as Christians, those of us who are Just War
defenders would do well to take seriously the Roman Catholic bishops' recent
endorsement of what I will refer to here as "vocational pacifism." This is not,
of course, a new emphasis in Roman Catholicism. The existence of special
"orders," involving special "vows" in the Roman Catholic community has made
it possible for people to pursue alternative lifestyles and commitments without
thereby standing in judgment on all those fellow believers who do not exhibit
the same patterns of living. A commitment to non-violence has a long history,
in monastic communities. It is not a coincidence, for example, that the bishops,
in discussing the merits of specific nonviolent experiments, refer to the commitment to nonviolence required of lay members of the Third Order of Franciscans.
To be sure, not all pacifists will appreciate having their perspective "vocationalized" in this manner. But this emphasis, if more widely recognized, and
if taken more seriously by other Just War groups, could bring about a practical
convergence on the question of whether at least some Christians ought to be
committing themselves to a way of life which is consistent with nonviolent
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principles.
Fourth, it is important that this kind of discussion also take place in the context
of a larger theological dialogue. Philosophical reflection un the issues of violence
and nonviolence cannot properly take place without attention to the requirements
of a theology of peace-making. Our stance with regard to military policies--especially in this time when we are producing weapons of unthinkable destructioncannot be divorced from our understanding of the creating intentions of the God
to whom the earth in all of its fullness belongs. Nor can we think about such
matters without acknowledging our human sinfulness, which so often leads us
into self-deception and perverse thinking in this area of concern.
Our philosophical reflections on these matters must also be shaped by our
ecc1esiological sensitivities. As Christians we are members of the one universal
church, drawn from every tribe, tongue, people and nation of the earth. An
awareness of this fact is not only important for Christians as such, but also for
Christian philosophers in their philosophizing. Our thoughts and arguments on
these matters must display the internationalist and intercultural sensitivities which
are appropriate to who we are as servants of Jesus Christ. We desperately need
to allow ourselves to be influenced in our philosophizing by the needs and
perspectives of the whole church, which is presently dispersed among the peoples
and nations of the earth. Of crucial importance here is the fact that we are bound
in Christ to the poor and the oppressed of the earth; we must allow their concerns
to crowd into our consciousness and to influence our agenda as we address the
issues of war and peace.
Our philosophical efforts in this area, if they are properly grounded in a
theology of peace-making, will give expression to our hope in, and longing for,
the future Reign of Christ-wherein justice and peace will indeed embrace.
When that Reign arrives, the debate between pacifists and Just War theorists
will presumably come to an end. It is not likely that the debate will end before
then-and perhaps that is a very good thing. But the knowledge that this particular
kind of warfare will also someday cease, says something-I think-about the
spirit in which we ought to be conducting our discussions here and now. I hope
that my remarks here are accepted as an appropriate manifestation of that spirit.
Calvin College
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